



Sakula DLL planting analysis

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Contents

1 Handling information	3
2 Introduction	3
2.1 Analysed sample	3
2.2 Thanks	3
3 Understanding the chain of execution	4
3.1 Overview	4
4 Dropper executable	5
4.1 Identifying the XOR encoding function	5
4.2 Extracting the files	6
4.3 Extracting & decoding the files	7
4.4 Embedded files	8
4.5 Anti-sandbox checks	8
4.6 Self deletion	9
5 s.exe / MediaSoft.exe (Kaspersky installer)	10
5.1 Overview	10
5.2 Vulnerable code	10
5.3 Authenticode signature	10
6 msi.dll (planted DLL)	11
6.1 String obfuscation	11
6.2 Decode and call to shellcode	11
6.3 Breaking on load	11
6.3.1 Using WinDbg	11
6.3.2 Verifying the module has loaded	12
6.3.3 Examining how DllEntryPoint() is called	13

6.4	Decoding setup.msi	14
6.4.1	Breaking before decode	14
6.4.2	Inspecting shellcode memory permissions	14
6.4.3	Examining memory - before decode	15
6.4.4	Examining memory - after decode	15
6.4.5	Dumping shellcode memory region	16
7	setup.msi (injected shellcode & implant)	17
7.1	Overview	17
7.2	Locating kernel32	17
7.3	Position independence trick	17
7.4	Import resolution	18
8	Embedded implant	20
8.1	The implant	20
8.2	Decoding configuration	20
9	Signatures	21
10	Curiosities	23
10.1	Signing on msi.dll	23
10.2	GetCursorPos structure clearing	27
11	Similar files	28
11.1	Sakula	28
11.2	Other	28
11.2.1	Group 1 - PlugX	29
11.2.2	Group 2 - PlugX	29
11.2.3	Group 3 - Maudi	29
12	Useful breakpoints	30
12.1	Kaspersky executable	30
12.2	msi.dll	30
12.3	Shellcode	30
13	Changes	31
14	Contact details	31

1 Handling information

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2 Introduction

This technical note discusses a version of Sakula uploaded to VirusTotal on the 25th April 2016. The sample initially looked interesting as it uses a signed Kaspersky binary to load itself, presumably to avoid UAC.

Further research online shows that usage of this technique by Sakula has previously been documented. A good detailed report is available from SecureWorks¹ covering the evolution of Sakula and the usage of signed executables (both legitimate binaries and stolen code signing certificates).

In the sample analysed the main implant is never saved to disk as an executable, a common technique used by malware in the last few years. The small size of this dropper and minimum amount of obfuscation make it an excellent sample to practise analysis. Therefore this technical note discusses one method which can be used to extract the Sakula implant from memory.

The overall aims are to:

- Extract the implant from memory after it has been decoded (enabling further analysis).
- Understand key sections of the overall chain of execution.

The following steps are discussed:

- Identifying a decoding routine and reimplementing it in Python.
- Using WinDbg to analyse code in a `DLLEntryPoint` function.
- Dumping memory using WinDbg for further analysis.

The techniques used are valid for any program which conducts unpacks and executes itself in memory.

2.1 Analysed sample

The sample analysed² was uploaded to VirusTotal on the 25th April 2016, no original filename information was available. Almost identical binaries exist on VirusTotal from throughout 2014 and 2015, a list of similar samples is provided at the end of the document.

The file is not digitally signed and has no resources, therefore no icon. It hit on a number of custom Sakula signatures which are provided in section 9. Specific detections by anti-virus products include Backdoor.Win32.Mivast.o (Kaspersky) and Trojan/Win32.Sakelua (AhnLab). Microsoft link it to Trojan/Win32/Derusbi.A!dha.

A number of other files use the vulnerable Kaspersky installer in exactly the same way, including PlugX and Maudi. See section 11 for more information.

2.2 Thanks

Thanks to Cedric Halbronn for technical assistance and review during the creation of this document.

Thanks to Marc Ochsenmeier (@ochsenmeier³) for clarifying why the Kaspersky executable attempts to load `msi.dll` twice.

Whilst writing this document the website `windbg.info`⁴ was very useful.

¹<https://www.secureworks.com/research/sakula-malware-family>

²SHA256: db8867508b131a2c66873a1c70a5cc82102576227a17aebdf42f72606d84b535

³<https://twitter.com/ochsenmeier>

⁴<http://windbg.info/>

3 Understanding the chain of execution

3.1 Overview

A graphical overview of the steps taken by this malware is shown in figure 1. Items coloured green are saved to disk, items coloured blue only exist in memory.




Figure 1: Overview of the files analysed in this technical note

This technical note is designed to be read in conjunction with the IDA databases, available separately.

4 Dropper executable

The first executable is a dropper containing three other files which are saved to disk. All functions are called directly from `WinMain()`, the overall steps are:

- Opens itself for read access using `sub_401034`.
- Locates all three embedded files by looking for 8 byte markers using `sub_401000`.
- Conducts a basic anti-sandbox check in `WinMain()`.
- Decodes two of the embedded files with XOR using `sub_4011CC`.
- Locates `%TEMP%` and saves three files: `s.exe`, `msi.dll` and `setup.msi`.
- Executes `s.exe` in `WinMain()`.
- Deletes itself using a common trick with `ping` in `sub_401154`.

Now we know the data is embedded inside the executable it is necessary to identify the encoding mechanism.

4.1 Identifying the XOR encoding function

In a small executable it is possible to identify the XOR routine quickly by hand. The conditions to look for are an XOR instruction in a loop where at least one of the operands is loaded from memory.

An automated alternative is to use the “interesting XOR”⁵ IDA script from Jason Jones, which returns:

```
Interesting in XorDecode XOR al 68h @ 0x4011E6
Interesting XOR in a loop XorDecode @ 4011E6: xor    al, 68h
```

In this case it is exactly right, a manual review of the whole function is shown below. This is XOR with a fixed key of 0x68 (the character h) but null bytes and bytes equal to the key are never encoded.

```
.text:004011CC XorDecode      proc near                ; CODE XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+1EB
.text:004011CC                                     ; WinMain(x,x,x,x)+1F8
.text:004011CC
.text:004011CC lpBuffer      = dword ptr  8
.text:004011CC dwLength     = dword ptr  0Ch
.text:004011CC
.text:004011CC  push    ebp
.text:004011CD  mov     ebp, esp          ; Standard function prologue
.text:004011CF  xor     edx, edx
.text:004011D1  cmp    [ebp+dwLength], edx ; Is the length 0?
.text:004011D4  jle    short end         ; Nothing to do, skip to end
.text:004011D6
.text:004011D6 loop:                                     ; CODE XREF: XorDecode+22
.text:004011D6  mov    eax, [ebp+lpBuffer]
.text:004011D9  lea   ecx, [edx+eax]    ; Get address of current byte
.text:004011DC  mov    al, [ecx]        ; Load current byte into AL
.text:004011DE  test  al, al            ; Is the current byte null (0x00)?
.text:004011E0  jz    short next
.text:004011E2  cmp   al, 68h          ; Does the current byte == the key (0x68)?
.text:004011E4  jz    short next
.text:004011E6  xor   al, 68h          ; XOR data byte with the key
.text:004011E8  mov   [ecx], al        ; Move the decoded byte back into the buffer
.text:004011EA
.text:004011EA next:                                     ; CODE XREF: XorDecode+14
```

⁵https://github.com/arbor-jones/idaico/blob/master/idaico/widgets/interesting_xor.py

```

.text:004011EA                                     ; XorDecode+18
.text:004011EA   inc     edx             ; Increment counter (i++)
.text:004011EB   cmp     edx, [ebp+dwLength] ; Compare counter and length
.text:004011EE   jl     short loop       ; Keep going until counter == length
.text:004011F0
.text:004011F0 end:                                     ; CODE XREF: XorDecode+8
.text:004011F0   pop     ebp             ; Standard function epilogue
.text:004011F1   retn
.text:004011F1
.text:004011F1 XorDecode     endp

```

The assembly sequence shown above was the original detection mechanism for this binary. It is used consistently throughout a number of Sakula executables (with different key bytes) and therefore makes a good signature. Yara signatures are provided toward the end of this technical note in section 9.

Calls to this function are shown below. There are two in the dropper executable, manually commented during analysis:




Figure 2: Cross-references to the XOR decode function

Now that we understand the above routine we can find the data and decode it manually.

4.2 Extracting the files

It is possible to execute the dropper and retrieve the three embedded files from %TEMP%. However to automate the process we need to understand where they are located in the file.

Near the start of WinMain() there is a call to sub_401034 which opens the executable for read access using GetModuleFileAameA() and CreateFileA(). The entire file is read into memory using ReadFile() and stored for later use.

This buffer is then used immediately, three calls are made to sub_401000 which is named FindDataInBuffer below.

```

.text:00401247   push   [esp+458h+dwFileLength]
.text:0040124B   mov     dl, 54h           ; dl is now 0x54 == 'T'
.text:0040124D   call   FindDataInBuffer
.text:00401252   push   [esp+45Ch+dwFileLength]
.text:00401256   add     dl, 0F8h         ; dl is now 0x4C == 'L'
.text:00401259   mov     esi, eax
.text:0040125B   call   FindDataInBuffer
.text:00401260   push   [esp+460h+dwFileLength]
.text:00401264   mov     dl, 45h          ; dl is now 0x45 == 'E'
.text:00401266   mov     ebx, eax
.text:00401268   call   FindDataInBuffer

```

This function looks for the same byte repeated 8 times consecutively in a buffer. The function is annotated in the IDA database (available from Github), a rough equivalent in C is shown below:

```

LPBYTE FindDataInBuffer(LPBYTE buf, DWORD dwLength, char marker) {
    DWORD i = 0;
    DWORD j = 0;

    while (i < dwLength) {
        if (buf[i] == marker) {
            // Note the code starts with j equal to zero, but
            // would be more efficient if it was 1 :)
            j = 0;
            while (j < 8 && buf[i+j] == marker) {
                j++;
            }

            if (j == 8) return (LPBYTE)(buf+i);
        }

        i++;
    }

    return 0;
}

```

With the knowledge that a string like TTTTTTTT should be in the file it is possible to find it using a hex editor:

```

00009880: 5454 5454 5454 5454 dd01 6ddb d9da 0b64  TTTTTTTT..m....d
00009890: 9860 a689 0000 e02a a9c8 0060 9b00 0000  .`.....*...`....
000098a0: 0b48 8cd8 6019 8a00 00b9 48c8 d2d1 d341  .H..`.....H....A
000098b0: 4a84 00dd 016d d903 c580 603e 8000 0089  J....m....`>....
000098c0: 4930 00a8 c800 a149 0140 d141 4a8c 00dd  I0.....I.@.AJ...
000098d0: 016d d903 c580 6012 8000 0089 4930 7390  .m....`.....I0s.
000098e0: c800 a149 0140 d141 4a8c 00dd 016d b948  ...I.@.AJ....m.H

```

Immediately following the TTTTTTTT marker is the encoded file data, which can now be automatically extracted and decoded.

4.3 Extracting & decoding the files

In most cases it should be possible to run the dropper in a virtual machine to safely extract the files. Where this isn't desirable (or to automate mass extraction) a script can be written. The required steps are:

- Identifies the correct XOR key byte, in case it changes.
- Scans the file for all markers (e.g. TTTTTTTT) and stores their location.
- Extracts each chunk of data and decodes with XOR.

A sample Python implementation of the decode routine could be:

```

def xor(data, key):
    """ Standard non-null, non-key XOR """

    out = ""

```

```

for c in data:
    if ord(c) != 0 and c != key:
        c = chr(ord(c) ^ ord(key))

    out += c

return out

```

A full Python script that extracts the embedded files automatically is provided separately.

4.4 Embedded files

The files contained in the dropper are summarised in the table below.

SHA256	Marker	Name
83f40e70ea3ba0e614d08f1070dafa75092660003b8a1f8b563d4f5b012f4bae	EEEEEEEE	s.exe
2213038421a599c843ad7559cfaabb2a32488774acd5982c0bb4ab234580c8a8	LLLLLLLL	msi.dll
7f5e2f6d56fca11d4e6006e375027d4e6c72c5baf5cf10aa98f00e9368b98ddb	TTTTTTTT	setup.msi

4.5 Anti-sandbox checks

The executable attempts anti-sandbox techniques by checking that the mouse pointer has moved in both the X and the Y directions. It does this by obtaining the location of the mouse pointer at the start of WinMain() using GetCursorPos() and storing the position in a local variable.

The code which obtains the first mouse position is shown below:

```

.text:004011FE      and      [esp+44Ch+OriginalMouseLocation.x], 0 ; Set X position to 0

; Some unrelated instructions skipped

.text:0040120A      mov      esi, ds:GetCursorPos

; Some unrelated instructions skipped

.text:00401211      xor      eax, eax
.text:00401213      lea     edi, [esp+458h+OriginalMouseLocation.y]
.text:00401217      stosd   ; Set Y position to 0
.text:00401217      ;
.text:00401217      ; stosd will store 0 from eax
.text:00401217      ; into memory location in edi
.text:00401218      jmp     short GetInitialCursorPos
.text:0040121A
.text:0040121A Wait:
.text:0040121A      push    1 ; dwMilliseconds
.text:0040121C      call   ds:Sleep
.text:00401222
.text:00401222 GetInitialCursorPos:
.text:00401222      lea     eax, [esp+458h+OriginalMouseLocation]
.text:00401226      push   eax ; lpPoint
.text:00401227      call   esi ; GetCursorPos
.text:00401229      test   eax, eax
.text:0040122B      jz     short Wait

```

Later in WinMain() the mouse location is obtained again. The original and updated values are compared to ensure that both X and Y coordinates have changed, as seen below.

```
.text:004013A6 WaitForMouseMove:                ; CODE XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+1E1
.text:004013A6     mov     esi, ds:GetCursorPos
.text:004013AC     jmp     short CheckMouseAgain
.text:004013AE
.text:004013AE Sleep:                        ; CODE XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+1CD
.text:004013AE     push   1                ; dwMilliseconds
.text:004013B0     call  ds:Sleep
.text:004013B6
.text:004013B6 CheckMouseAgain:                ; CODE XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+1BA
.text:004013B6     lea   eax, [esp+458h+UpdatedMouseLocation] ; CheckMouseAgain
.text:004013BA     push  eax                ; lpPoint
.text:004013BB     call  esi ; GetCursorPos
.text:004013BD     test  eax, eax
.text:004013BF     jz    short Sleep
.text:004013C1
.text:004013C1 CheckPosX:                    ; Check the mouse has moved in the X
.text:004013C1                    ; direction (left to right)
.text:004013C1     mov   eax, [esp+458h+UpdatedMouseLocation.x]
.text:004013C5     cmp   eax, [esp+458h+OriginalMouseLocation.x]
.text:004013C9     jnz   short MouseHasMoved
.text:004013CB
.text:004013CB CheckPosY:                    ; Check the mouse has moved in the Y
.text:004013CB                    ; direction (up and down)
.text:004013CB     mov   eax, [esp+458h+UpdatedMouseLocation.y]
.text:004013CF     cmp   eax, [esp+458h+OriginalMouseLocation.y]
.text:004013D3     jz    short WaitForMouseMove
```

4.6 Self deletion

The final action taken is to delete itself from disk. The dropper does this by:

- Calling GetModuleFileNameA() to retrieve the executable name.
- Running the ping utility to get a short delay, followed by del.
- Exiting the process immediately afterward (an executable cannot be deleted whilst running).

The final command looks like below, the command string is visible in the dropper (%s is replaced with the file name using sprintf).

```
cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.1 & del /q \"%s\"
```

5 s.exe / MediaSoft.exe (Kaspersky installer)

5.1 Overview

This program is named “Программа установки Антивируса Касперского 6.0 для Windows Workstations” or “Setup Kaspersky Anti-Virus 6.0 for Windows Workstations”. It is a genuine Kaspersky setup program and contains a valid code signature.

Load order vulnerabilities including DLL planting first received widespread publicity in 2010, information from code signing and the PE header indicate this binary was written in 2008. There are a number of benefits to using a legitimate, signed application in this way. The first is that UAC behaves differently for signed binaries, perhaps looking less suspicious to the user. The second is that analysts are less likely to scrutinise a legitimate executable which has been signed by a reputable company.

5.2 Vulnerable code

The DLL hijacking vulnerability is located in sub_401460, where msi.dll is dynamically loaded with LoadLibraryA:

```
.text:0040146F    push    offset LibFileName ; "msi.dll"  
.text:00401474    call   ds:LoadLibraryA
```

Microsoft provide information on the DLL search order⁶ process used by Windows. The file msi.dll is not on the list of known DLLs⁷ therefore the copy in %WINDIR%\system32 is not automatically used.

Because of this vulnerability the Kaspersky installer will load the planted msi.dll from the same directory, running code provided by the attacker. The call to LoadLibraryA above is sufficient to trigger the Sakula code, execution will never return to the Kaspersky binary from msi.dll.

5.3 Authenticode signature

Signature details are verified by Windows as shown below.




Figure 3: Kaspersky signed binary

⁶[https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682586\(v=vs.85\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682586(v=vs.85).aspx)

⁷HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs

6 msi.dll (planted DLL)

Analysis in IDA Pro shows that `msi.dll` only has two functions. The first is the `DllEntryPoint()` which contains nearly all code. The second is identical in operation to the XOR decode function from the dropper but the key byte is provided as an argument instead of being hard coded.

Static analysis shows that `msi.dll` takes the following steps to load shellcode from `setup.msi`:

- Obtains the full path to `msi.dll` using `GetModuleFileNameA`
- Searches from the end of the string backward for the first `\` character (to get the directory).
- Appends `setup.msi` as seen above.
- Loads this file into memory and XOR decodes it.
- Calls the loaded code in memory.

6.1 String obfuscation

`msi.dll` contains some minor string obfuscation to build the filename `setup.msi`, shown below. No other anti-disassembly or security product evasion is evident.

```
code:100010D      push    'i'
code:100010D3     push    'sm.p'
code:100010D8     push    'utes'           ; String stacking
code:100010DD     push    esp              ; Source
code:100010DE     push    ds:lpFileName    ; Dest
code:100010E4     call   strcat
```

6.2 Decode and call to shellcode

Much of `msi.dll` is standard API calls to locate `setup.msi` and read it into memory. The final steps can be seen below, decoding the buffer and calling `eax`:

```
code:1000115C     push    88h              ; XOR key byte
code:10001161     push    [ebp+dwSize]     ; Size of setup.msi
code:10001164     push    [ebp+lpBuffer]  ; Address of buffer
code:10001167     call   XorDecode
code:1000116C     mov    eax, [ebp+lpBuffer]
code:1000116F     call   eax               ; Call decoded shellcode
```

Therefore to analyse this code further we must stop debugging before the call at address `1000116F`.

6.3 Breaking on load

The first challenge is breaking into the `DllEntryPoint()` code in `msi.dll` before it runs. The Kaspersky binary uses `LoadLibrary` but the load of the DLL is done entirely by Windows. Stepping over the `LoadLibrary` call means that code in the `DllEntryPoint` function will be run automatically. Single stepping through all of `LoadLibrary` is tedious and time consuming.

6.3.1 Using WinDbg

The easiest mechanism is to set an exception any time a module named `msi` is loaded using the WinDbg command `sxe`. This command is explained on Riham Selim's blog⁸ at MSDN. Filters added in this way can be viewed or modified using the menu option `Debug > Event Filters...`

⁸<https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/rihamselim/2012/03/14/breaking-on-module-load/>

Sakula DLL planting analysis

```
# Break when msi.dll is loaded
0:000> sxe ld msi

# Continue debugging
0:000> g
ModLoad: 7d1e0000 7d49c000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\msi.dll
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=008f0000 edx=7c90e514 esi=00000000 edi=00000000
eip=7c90e514 esp=0012ef94 ebp=0012f088 iopl=0         nv up ei ng nz ac pe nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000296
ntdll!KiFastSystemCallRet:
7c90e514 c3                ret

# Continue debugging
0:000> g
ModLoad: 10000000 10005000 C:\Documents and Settings\User\Desktop\Sakula\msi.dll
eax=0012fb68 ebx=00000000 ecx=6569736d edx=00000000 esi=00000000 edi=00000000
eip=7c90e514 esp=0012eba0 ebp=0012ec94 iopl=0         nv up ei ng nz ac pe nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000296
ntdll!KiFastSystemCallRet:
7c90e514 c3                ret
```

There is an initial break for C:\WINDOWS\system32\msi.dll but the load fails (eax is null, no valid handle is returned). This occurs because of the code in sub_402510 in the Kaspersky installer that loads msi.dll and obtains the version number using DllGetVersion (note: this first call is safe because msi.dll is appended to the result of GetSystemDirectoryA).

The second exception is for the planted malicious DLL and LoadLibrary returns a handle address of 0012fb68 in eax. In this case the load is unsafe because there is no explicit path, therefore the planted version from the application directory is used.

6.3.2 Verifying the module has loaded

msi.dll has now been loaded into memory by Windows, this can be verified using !m to list modules:

```
0:000> !m
start      end          module name
00400000 0040b000    setup      (deferred)
10000000 10005000    msi        (no symbols)
.. other modules omitted ..
```

Therefore msi.dll has been loaded at its preferred base address of 0x10000000 and functions will have the same addresses shown in IDA, making debugging easier. IDA suggests that DllEntryPoint() is located at 10001031, this can be verified in WinDbg using the display headers extension !dh:

```
0:000> !dh msi

File Type: DLL
FILE HEADER VALUES
   14C machine (i386)
     4 number of sections
53BD80C2 time date stamp Wed Jul 09 19:49:54 2014

     0 file pointer to symbol table
     0 number of symbols
    E0 size of optional header
```

```

210E characteristics
    Executable
    Line numbers stripped
    Symbols stripped
    32 bit word machine
    DLL
  
```

```

OPTIONAL HEADER VALUES
    10B magic #
    0.40 linker version
    200 size of code
    600 size of initialized data
    0 size of uninitialized data
    1031 address of entry point
    1000 base of code
    ----- new -----
10000000 image base

.. other headers omitted ..
  
```

This shows image base of `0x10000000` and address of entry point `0x1031`. Therefore disassembling code at `0x10001031` should reveal the same code shown in IDA at the entry point:

```

0:000> u msi+1031
msi+0x1031:
10001031 89ff          mov     edi,edi
10001033 55            push   ebp
10001034 89e5          mov     ebp,esp
10001036 83ec4c        sub     esp,4Ch
10001039 31c0          xor     eax,eax
1000103b 8b450c        mov     eax,dword ptr [ebp+0Ch]
1000103e 83f001        xor     eax,1
10001041 83f800        cmp     eax,0
  
```

Correlating this code with IDA shows what we expect - the planted `msi.dll` has been loaded and is ready to run. We can now break anywhere we choose in the `msi` module.

6.3.3 Examining how `DllEntryPoint()` is called

With `msi` loaded we can inspect the sequence of calls from `LoadLibrary` in the Kaspersky executable through to `DllEntryPoint` in `msi` by displaying a stack backtrace with `k`:

```

0:000> k
ChildEBP RetAddr
0012eba0 7c91c4fa msi+0x1031
0012eca8 7c916371 ntdll!LdrpRunInitializeRoutines+0x344
0012ef54 7c9164d3 ntdll!LdrpLoadDll+0x3e5
0012f1fc 7c801bbd ntdll!LdrLoadDll+0x230
0012f264 7c801d72 kernel32!LoadLibraryExW+0x18e
0012f278 7c801da8 kernel32!LoadLibraryExA+0x1f
0012f294 0040147a kernel32!LoadLibraryA+0x94
0012f7c4 004036f5 setup+0x147a
0012ffc0 7c817077 setup+0x36f5
0012fff0 00000000 kernel32!BaseProcessStart+0x23
  
```

The calls lead to `LdrpRunInitializeRoutines`, an internal Windows routine responsible for calling the entry point of executables or DLLs. More information is available in Matt Pietrek's article⁹ from the Microsoft Windows Journal.

This illustrates why execution never returns to the Kaspersky executable and why stopping in the `DllEntryPoint` is not as simple as setting a normal breakpoint.

6.4 Decoding `setup.msi`

In the `msi` module the file `setup.msi` is loaded from disk and decoded using XOR (key byte `0x88`), as shown in section 6.2. Therefore we could decode `setup.msi` manually, but practise to analyse advanced encoding techniques is valuable.

The steps described below work whether simple string obfuscation or more complex encryption is used, as long as the right functions and memory regions can be identified.

6.4.1 Breaking before decode

The first step is to break immediately before the XOR decode function call, located at `0x10001167`:

```
0:000> bp msi+1167
0:000> g
Breakpoint 0 hit
```

```
eax=00000001 ebx=10001031 ecx=0012ead0 edx=7c90e514 esi=0012eb94 edi=00000001
eip=10001167 esp=0012eadc ebp=0012eb30 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000202
msi+0x1167:
10001167 e894feffff      call     msi+0x1000 (10001000) ; Call XOR decode
```

```
0:000> ub
msi+0x115c:
1000115c 6888000000      push    88h                ; Key byte
10001161 ff75f4         push    dword ptr [ebp-0Ch] ; Length
10001164 ff75f8         push    dword ptr [ebp-8]   ; Buffer to decode
10001167 e894feffff      call     msi+0x1000 (10001000) ; We are here
1000116c 8b45f8         mov     eax,dword ptr [ebp-8]
1000116f ffd0          call     eax
10001171 6aff          push    0FFFFFFFh
10001173 e8c41e0000     call     msi+0x303c (1000303c)
```

By this point the file data is already in memory. A local variable holds a pointer to the data buffer, IDA names it `ebp+1pBuffer`. The value is located on the stack at `ebp-8`, seen pushed to the stack in the disassembly above.

This address can be inspected using the display pointer command (this adapts to 32-bit or 64-bit automatically):

```
0:000> dp ebp-8 L1
0012eb28 00380000
```

6.4.2 Inspecting shellcode memory permissions

The data to be decoded is therefore located at `0x380000`, a memory region previously returned by `VirtualAlloc`. Permissions on the page can be confirmed with `!address`, showing it has read/write/execute permissions:

⁹<https://www.microsoft.com/msj/0999/hood/hood0999.aspx>

```

0:000> !address 380000
Usage:                <unclassified>
Allocation Base:      00380000
Base Address:         00380000
End Address:          00388000
Region Size:          00008000
Type:                  00020000      MEM_PRIVATE
State:                 00001000      MEM_COMMIT
Protect:              00000040      PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
  
```

6.4.3 Examining memory - before decode

The contents of the memory region can now be examined. Rather than using the address directly it is easier to dereference the pointer using `poi(...)` in case memory locations change between runs.

```

0:000> db poi(ebp-8)
00380000 dd 01 6d db d9 da 0b 64-98 60 a6 89 00 00 e0 2a ..m....d.`.....*
00380010 a9 c8 00 60 9b 00 00 00-0b 48 8c d8 60 19 8a 00 ...`.....H...`...
00380020 00 b9 48 c8 d2 d1 d3 41-4a 84 00 dd 01 6d d9 03 ..H....AJ....m..
00380030 c5 80 60 3e 80 00 00 89-49 30 00 a8 c8 00 a1 49 ..`>....I0.....I
00380040 01 40 d1 41 4a 8c 00 dd-01 6d d9 03 c5 80 60 12 .@.AJ....m....`.
00380050 80 00 00 89 49 30 73 90-c8 00 a1 49 01 40 d1 41 ....I0s....I.@.A
00380060 4a 8c 00 dd 01 6d b9 48-ec 29 b8 00 00 00 03 c8 J....m.H.).....
00380070 84 03 c8 9c 03 00 03 00-03 c8 98 01 6d d5 4b dd .....m.K.
  
```

This memory region matches the start of `setup.msi` exactly, confirming it is the right data.

6.4.4 Examining memory - after decode

We can now step one time (over the function call, not into it) and then examine the memory again.

```

0:000> p
.. WinDbg steps over the XOR decode routine ..

0:000> db poi(ebp-8)
00380000 55 89 e5 53 51 52 83 ec-10 e8 2e 01 00 00 68 a2 U..SQR.....h.
00380010 21 40 00 e8 13 00 00 00-83 c0 04 50 e8 91 02 00 !@.....P....
00380020 00 31 c0 40 5a 59 5b c9-c2 0c 00 55 89 e5 51 8b .1.@ZY[....U..Q.
00380030 4d 08 e8 b6 08 00 00 01-c1 b8 00 20 40 00 29 c1 M.....@.).
00380040 89 c8 59 c9 c2 04 00 55-89 e5 51 8b 4d 08 e8 9a ..Y....U..Q.M...
00380050 08 00 00 01 c1 b8 fb 18-40 00 29 c1 89 c8 59 c9 .....@.)...Y.
00380060 c2 04 00 55 89 e5 31 c0-64 a1 30 00 00 00 8b 40 ...U..1.d.0....@
00380070 0c 8b 40 14 8b 00 8b 00-8b 40 10 89 e5 5d c3 55 ..@.....@...].U
  
```

This shows how the data has changed. The next instruction calls address `0x380000`, therefore we expect it to be valid code. This can be confirmed by disassembling it and checking the results look sane:

```

0:000> u poi(ebp-8)
00380000 55          push     ebp
00380001 89e5        mov     ebp,esp
00380003 53          push     ebx
00380004 51          push     ecx
00380005 52          push     edx
00380006 83ec10     sub     esp,10h
00380009 e82e010000 call    0038013c
  
```

This is valid code and appears to be a standard function prologue¹⁰.

6.4.5 Dumping shellcode memory region

The next step is to understand what this shellcode does. Dumping it from WinDbg for further analysis in IDA is possible using the `.writemem` command:

```
0:000> .writemem "C:\\Out\\setup-msi-decoded.dat" poi(ebp-8)
Writing 10000 bytes.....
Unable to read memory at 00388000, file is incomplete
```

The warning given by WinDbg does not affect our analysis because we want the entire memory region. An end address can be supplied if desired but WinDbg will simply stop when an invalid location in memory is accessed.

The output file can now be loaded into IDA.

¹⁰<http://stackoverflow.com/questions/14765406/function-prologue-and-epilogue-in-c>

7 setup.msi (injected shellcode & implant)

7.1 Overview

A few things are immediately visible in the decoded setup.msi file:

- The code appears to have been compiled from C rather than hand written (based on the quantity of code, standard function prologue / epilogues and the calling conventions used).
- Some uninitialised data is at offset 0x8FF, preceded by AAAA.
- A list of API function names is at offset 0x983, preceded by BBBB.
- There appears to be an embedded executable at offset 0xAA1, preceded by CCCC.
- A custom PE loader is included to launch the embedded executable (strings 'MZ' and 'PE' around offset 0x2B9 provide a small clue here).

Static analysis in IDA indicates the injected shellcode takes the following steps:

- Finds kernel32.dll in memory.
- Finds a number of 'essential' functions like VirtualProtect and LoadLibrary.
- Resolves the list of imports from offset 0x983.
- Loads the embedded executable, including parsing relocations and processing the import table.
- Calls eax at offset 0x3D1 to run the entry point of the embedded executable.

7.2 Locating kernel32

The standard code below is used to find kernel32 from the process environment block (PEB):

```

0:000> uf 380063
00380063  push  ebp
00380064  mov   ebp,esp
00380066  xor   eax,eax
00380068  mov   eax,dword ptr fs:[00000030h] ; Get the PEB
0038006e  mov   eax,dword ptr [eax+0Ch] ; Get PEB_LDR_DATA
00380071  mov   eax,dword ptr [eax+14h] ; In memory order module list
00380074  mov   eax,dword ptr [eax] ; Skip one module (using flink)
00380076  mov   eax,dword ptr [eax] ; Skip another module
00380078  mov   eax,dword ptr [eax+10h] ; eax is now kernel32
0038007b  mov   ebp,esp
0038007d  pop   ebp
0038007e  ret

```

Note the usage of this technique means the code (which is 32-bit) will not work correctly on 64-bit versions of Windows, where the standard module load order is different under WoW64.

7.3 Position independence trick

The following function appears right at the end of the shellcode to enable resolution of the variables in memory. These would normally be located in an executable's data section but this doesn't exist for the loaded shellcode.

Therefore all variables are offset from the end of the shellcode. The following function finds the location of the end of the shellcode by creating a dummy stack frame, saving the return address and adding 6 to skip over the remaining instructions.

```

seg000:000008ED FindEndOfShellcode   proc near
seg000:000008ED     push     ebp
seg000:000008EE     mov      ebp, esp
seg000:000008F0     call    $+5      ; Dummy call to save eip on stack
seg000:000008F5     pop      eax      ; eax now points to shellcode base+8F5
seg000:000008F6     add     eax, 6    ; eax now points to shellcode base+8FB
seg000:000008F9     leave   ; Remove dummy stack frame
seg000:000008FA     retn
seg000:000008FA FindEndOfShellcode   endp

```

7.4 Import resolution

Imports required by the shellcode and PE loader are resolved using `LoadLibrary` and then a manual walk of the export table to find the named function. Import loading happens in the function at offset `0x236`.

A list of function names and DLLs is provided at offset `0x983`:

```

0:000> db 380983
00380983 47 65 74 4d 6f 64 75 6c-65 46 69 6c 65 4e 61 6d  GetModuleFileNam
00380993 65 41 00 43 72 65 61 74-65 54 68 72 65 61 64 00  eA.CreateThread.
003809a3 53 6c 65 65 70 00 47 65-74 50 72 6f 63 65 73 73  Sleep.GetProcess
003809b3 48 65 61 70 00 47 65 74-50 72 6f 63 41 64 64 72  Heap.GetProcAddr
003809c3 65 73 73 00 47 65 74 4d-6f 64 75 6c 65 48 61 6e  ess.GetModuleHan
003809d3 64 6c 65 41 00 56 69 72-74 75 61 6c 41 6c 6c 6f  dleA.VirtualAllo
003809e3 63 00 56 69 72 74 75 61-6c 50 72 6f 74 65 63 74  c.VirtualProtect
003809f3 00 48 65 61 70 41 6c 6c-6f 63 00 4c 6f 61 64 4c  .HeapAlloc.LoadL

```

Entries containing a dot `.` are treated as module names and passed to `GetModuleHandleA` (note this relies on the DLL already being loaded). The function at offset `0x7f` is used to walk the export table and locate entries using string comparison.

Pointers to each function are stored at offset `0x8ff`, which initially starts empty:

```

0:000> dps 3808ff
003808ff 00000000
00380903 00000000
00380907 00000000

```

A complete list of resolved imports can be obtained when the function finishes with the `dps` command:

```

0:000> dps 3808ff
003808ff 7c80b56f kernel32!GetModuleFileNameA
00380903 7c8106d7 kernel32!CreateThread
00380907 7c802446 kernel32!Sleep
0038090b 7c80ac61 kernel32!GetProcessHeap
0038090f 7c80ae40 kernel32!GetProcAddress
00380913 7c80b741 kernel32!GetModuleHandleA
00380917 7c809af1 kernel32!VirtualAlloc
0038091b 7c801ad4 kernel32!VirtualProtect
0038091f 7c8090f6 kernel32!HeapAlloc
00380923 7c801d7b kernel32!LoadLibraryA
00380927 7c80ac7e kernel32!FreeLibrary
0038092b 7c809b84 kernel32!VirtualFree
0038092f 7c80910c kernel32!HeapFree
00380933 7c809ea1 kernel32!IsBadReadPtr
00380937 7e4507ea USER32!MessageBoxA

```

Sakula DLL planting analysis

```
0038093b 77c2c407 msvcrt!malloc
0038093f 77c475f0 msvcrt!memset
00380943 77c2c21b msvcrt!free
00380947 77c46f70 msvcrt!memcpy
0038094b 77c3f010 msvcrt!fopen
0038094f 77c411fb msvcrt!fread
00380953 77c40ab1 msvcrt!fclose
00380957 77c4624e msvcrt!stricmp
0038095b 77c2c437 msvcrt!realloc
```

This is the entire list of the Windows APIs required by the shellcode to load and execute the embedded implant executable. The embedded implant has additional API requirements which are handled when the shellcode PE loader parses the import table.

8 Embedded implant

8.1 The implant

The implant provides basic functionality to an adversary. This sample communicates using HTTP and an unusual user-agent which claims to be a Media Center PC. Further information is available in two blog posts from Airbus Cyber Security (first¹¹, second¹²).

Strings from the implant are visible in the executable in memory:

```
cmd.exe /c reg add %s\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
/v "%s" /t REG_SZ /d "%s"
HKLM
HKCU
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\
cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.1 & del "%s" & del "%s%s" & del "%s%s"
cmd.exe /c rundll32 "%s" ActiveQvaw "%s"
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0;
SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729;
Media Center PC 6.0)
*//*
HTTP/1.1
POST
cmd.exe /c
cmd.exe /c "%s"
.exe
%d_%d_%d_%s
Self Process Id:%d
```

8.2 Decoding configuration

Configuration for the Sakula implant is stored in the executable's data section preceded by the marker hhhhhhhh. It is encoded with XOR 0x56 in the same way as all other components (non-null, non-key).

When decoded manually the following strings are visible:

- \MicroSoftMedia (install directory)
- MediaSoft.exe (install file)
- 10615 (configuration location)
- %Temp% (install base)
- MicroSoftMedia (service install name)
- hxxp://180.210.206.246/photo/%s.jpg?id=%d (C2 location)
- hxxp://180.210.206.246/view.asp?cstring=%s&tom=%d&id=%d (C2 location)

Extraction of this configuration is automated by MICE¹³, available on NCC Group's labs site¹⁴.

¹¹<http://blog.airbuscybersecurity.com/post/2015/09/APT-BlackVine-Malware-Sakula>

¹²[http://blog.airbuscybersecurity.com/post/2015/10/Malware-Sakula-Evolutions-\(Part-2/2\)](http://blog.airbuscybersecurity.com/post/2015/10/Malware-Sakula-Evolutions-(Part-2/2))

¹³<https://labs.nccgroup.trust/mice>

¹⁴<https://labs.nccgroup.trust/>

9 Signatures

The following signatures can be used to detect the various stages of this malware.

Please note these may have been formatted for readability - the signatures are provided in a separate file.

```
rule malware_sakula_xorloop {
  meta:
    description = "XOR loops from Sakula malware"
    author = "David Cannings"
    md5 = "fc6497fe708dbda9355139721b6181e7"

  strings:
    $mz = "MZ"

    // XOR decode loop (non-null, non-key byte only)
    $opcodes_decode_loop01 =
      { 31 C0 8A 04 0B 3C 00 74 09 38 D0 74 05 30 D0 88 04 0B }

    // XOR decode
    $opcodes_decode_loop02 =
      { 8B 45 08 8D 0C 02 8A 01 84 C0 74 08 3C ?? 74 04 34 ?? 88 01 }

  condition:
    $mz at 0 and any of ($opcodes*)
}

rule malware_sakula_memory {
  meta:
    description = "Sakula malware - strings after unpacking (memory rule)"
    author = "David Cannings"
    md5 = "b3852b9e7f2b8954be447121bb6b65c3"

  strings:
    $str01 = "cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.1 & del \"%s\""
    $str02 = "cmd.exe /c rundll32 \"%s\" Play \"%s\""
    $str03 = "Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+8.0;+Windows+NT+5.1;+SV1)"
    $str04 = "cmd.exe /c cmd.exe /c cmd.exe /c cmd.exe /c cmd.exe /c cmd.exe /c \"%s\""
    $str05 = "Self Process Id:%d"
    $str06 = "%d_%d_%d_%s"
    $str07 = "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0;
      SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center
      PC 6.0)"
    $str08 = "cmd.exe /c rundll32 \"%s\" ActiveQvaw \"%s\""

    // Encode loop, operations: rol 1; xor ??;
    $opcodes01 = { 83 F9 00 74 0E 31 C0 8A 03 D0 C0 34 ?? 88 03 49 43 EB ED }

    // Encode loop, single byte XOR
    $opcodes02 = { 31 C0 8A 04 13 32 01 83 F8 00 75 0E 83 FA 00 74 04 49 4A }

  condition:
    4 of them
}
```

```

rule malware_sakula_shellcode {
  meta:
    description = "Sakula shellcode - taken from decoded setup.msi but may not be unique
                  enough to identify Sakula"
    author = "David Cannings"

  strings:
    /*
      55                push    ebp
      89 E5             mov     ebp, esp
      E8 00 00 00 00    call   $+5
      58                pop     eax
      83 C0 06          add     eax, 6
      C9                leave
      C3                retn
    */
    // Get EIP technique (may not be unique enough to identify Sakula)
    // Note this only appears in memory or decoded files
    $opcodes01 = { 55 89 E5 E8 00 00 00 00 58 83 C0 06 C9 C3 }

    /*
      8B 5E 3C          mov     ebx, [esi+3Ch] ; Offset to PE header
      8B 5C 1E 78       mov     ebx, [esi+ebx+78h] ; Length of headers
      8B 4C 1E 20       mov     ecx, [esi+ebx+20h] ; Number of data directories
      53                push   ebx
      8B 5C 1E 24       mov     ebx, [esi+ebx+24h] ; Export table
      01 F3            add     ebx, esi
    */
    // Export parser
    $opcodes02 = { 8B 5E 3C 8B 5C 1E 78 8B 4C 1E 20 53 8B 5C 1E 24 01 F3 }

  condition:
    any of them
}

```

10 Curiosities

10.1 Signing on msi.dll

Inside the dropper not all of msi.dll is encoded. Toward the end of the embedded file a code signing table is visible, which uses a known stolen certificate from DTOPTOOLZ (serial 47D5D5372BCB1562B4C9F4C2BDF13587).

```

00011690: 2556 6572 6953 6967 6e20 436c 6173 7320 %VeriSign Class
000116a0: 3320 436f 6465 2053 6967 6e69 6e67 2032 3 Code Signing 2
000116b0: 3031 3020 4341 301e 170d 3133 3038 3238 010 CA0...130828
000116c0: 3030 3030 3030 5a17 0d31 3430 3932 3732 000000Z..1409272
000116d0: 3335 3935 395a 3081 cb31 0b30 0906 0355 35959Z0..1.0...U
000116e0: 0406 1302 4b52 310e 300c 0603 5504 0813 ...KR1.0...U...
000116f0: 0553 454f 554c 3110 300e 0603 5504 0713 .SEOUL1.0...U...
00011700: 074d 6170 6f2d 6775 311b 3019 0603 5504 .Mapo-gu1.0...U.
00011710: 0a14 1244 544f 5054 4f4f 4c5a 2043 6f2e ...DTOPTOOLZ Co.
00011720: 2c4c 7464 2e31 3e30 3c06 0355 040b 1335 ,Ltd.1>0<...U...5
00011730: 4469 6769 7461 6c20 4944 2043 6c61 7373 Digital ID Class
00011740: 2033 202d 204d 6963 726f 736f 6674 2053 3 - Microsoft S
00011750: 6f66 7477 6172 6520 5661 6c69 6461 7469 oftware Validati
00011760: 6f6e 2076 3231 2030 1e06 0355 040b 1417 on v21 0...U....
00011770: 4d61 6e61 6765 6d65 6e74 2053 7570 706f Management Suppo
00011780: 7274 2054 6561 6d31 1b30 1906 0355 0403 rt Team1.0...U..
00011790: 1412 4454 4f50 544f 4f4c 5a20 436f 2e2c ..DTOPTOOLZ Co.,
000117a0: 4c74 642e 3082 0122 300d 0609 2a86 4886 Ltd.0.."0...*.H.
.. skipped ..
000122b0: 060a 2b06 0104 0182 3702 010c 313a 3038 ..+.....7...1:08
000122c0: a036 8034 0041 0064 006f 0062 0065 0020 .6.4.A.d.o.b.e.
000122d0: 0052 0065 0061 0064 0065 0072 0020 0058 .R.e.a.d.e.r. .X
000122e0: 0049 0020 0050 0044 0046 0020 0056 0069 .I. .P.D.F. .V.i
000122f0: 0065 0077 0065 0072 300d 0609 2a86 4886 .e.w.e.r0...*.H.

```

When the dropper decodes the DLL this portion is actually XOR encoded and is not visible in msi.dll on disk.

Inspecting the PE headers of the dumped binary shows that Certificate Table entry is empty, as shown in figure 4 (note that LordPE labels it "Security").

Therefore it appears the malware author appended an authenticode signature manually but did not update the headers. A PE editor can be used to "fix" this value to offset A03, length ED8.

However as expected this results in an invalid signature, shown in figure 6. This is not surprising - but as the malware author apparently had access to the stolen certificate it is unusual the DLL was not code signed correctly.




Figure 4: Missing Certificate Table entry from ms i . dll




Figure 5: LordPE being used to edit the Certificate Table entry




Figure 6: Invalid signature on msi.dll

10.2 GetCursorPos structure clearing

The assembly code which sets the X and Y values to 0 may look unusual at first. The original C would have been something like:

```
POINT p;  
p.x = 0;  
p.y = 0;  
BOOL bResult = GetCursorPos(&p);
```

The X value is set to 0 like below:

```
.text:004011FE    and     [esp+44Ch+OriginalMouseLocation.x], 0 ; Set X position to 0
```

But the Y value is set with a different set of instructions:

```
.text:00401211    xor     eax, eax  
.text:00401213    lea    edi, [esp+458h+OriginalMouseLocation.y]  
.text:00401217    stosd                ; Set Y position to 0
```

Is this some nefarious technique, hand coded in assembly language? In this case: probably no. This code was likely generated by an optimising compiler, which has been very smart at emitting two different methods of setting the memory locations to 0.

A modern superscalar processor will have different execution units for different types of operation, which may allow the above to run in parallel (e.g. at almost the same time, rather than sequentially).

11 Similar files

11.1 Sakula

These files install Sakula and are directly related to the dropper analysed in this document.

SHA256	First VT upload
3051c3dc2bf03846c2a635d684a7bffd9b758655dab99aef7ce9b2e77085ff50	31 Jul 2014 (#1)
32a6541feb8a679b44c85c3b9d01be52b2176ccf87d77213f8d6f5bbfc3de3cf	07 Aug 2014 (#2)
9b0669d2478f4c5d6851b79b9b70621141dfaba0858934a59add578f656ee7b2	19 Aug 2014 (#3)
45f8eb1c1c6d15c9bee304fb02faf6c5bc0f44b5953b8ddb084126805da12488	24 Mar 2015
40e8252887fae302d5c972630127e8b14bca004dda149eebad9c02afab5574a1	01 Apr 2015
e720936f1d76ff353de563508df0fc1e38fe14ef6e8ec2ff7918220d8e56b3fe	02 Jul 2015
db8867508b131a2c66873a1c70a5cc82102576227a17aebdf42f72606d84b535	25 Apr 2016

Note 1 - this was named CACI Juniper SSL VPN ActiveX.exe and is signed with the stolen DTOPTOOLZ certificate. It looks like a fake installer and opens the victim's browser to the CACI Portal (portal.caci.com).

Note 2 - this looks like an Adobe Reader installer and is signed with the stolen DTOPTOOLZ certificate.

Note 3 - This is named Security Mail Exchange ActiveX Control.exe and is signed with the stolen DTOPTOOLZ certificate. It is another fake installer targeted at the Mongolian cabinet (cabinet.gov.mn).

11.2 Other

These files also use the vulnerable Kaspersky executable and can be placed into three distinct groups.

SHA256	First seen (VT)	Group
8c7c6cff2bfa4add97327ffd527bab192993cc6a2d86b2c025795f7a7b333803	06 Jun 2014	1
679e4f1b7d8e1716bfb09890a5bbe44982bec59704039d497d3940a89d316cd4	14 Jul 2014	2
d5cf2e4d854e4e703f6ea062a703d762c78f9d4deeccaded15f94e7f525e162f	14 Jul 2014	2
fcd763359955efc5d11ae1ac7821b6ad188fe5f84ecaf3749c7fb8db4dcc4933	14 Jul 2014	2
75b82656485b6c74ca3761500673cd147ff1de57e4681df5ac8c94ca9780c8b5	16 Jul 2014	2
dbfbab10b466af48ae040f17f3d0d3e8ad46d4fe8d3dab7ca39e1c03515790e0	16 Jul 2014	2
6bd20aebf171a4c1e638d34539726798d461c10223ed4f41400f53fb5a7374b9	16 Jul 2014	2
5da167bd29a0949bb7cfe441cab3430d4701ab8b0cd1362ba9d7be40c32d3270	23 Jul 2014	2
3f7e841b762636f9e810225df726151abd58304b103cfd1a4f0af17b3dd3e478	13 Aug 2014	3
c1e1149e2e83710bd19549e438325b9aa3245760a15283ee207501fea9387b1e	13 Aug 2014	3
040eb2c639a5bec1558d98e17251eb2769be97a87831ca05477736480267724e	13 Aug 2014	3
818f5a903c08c7430f5512f02d9100573e9260e376d5741456735bf46a48c7a9	01 Sep 2014	3
e4a45efde498c2eb3202b82dcde9a77e654c02937742e9966cdb97660dd30641	17 Oct 2014	3
9fc1a21fa6aa0960c375f59306f257f35a4879a7a049575c729694241343696c	24 Oct 2014	3
e4540d40afcf52b199ec21a981fa47bdc16f450e4ccaf4a80026fb7218e1cd9b	24 Oct 2014	3
7d37076bb7f1aff13d0f63fcb2c60c16b3b8166e7a5989d00b8b54e21203d560	25 Oct 2014	2
d0f0027e75ba9cdfaa5aa55a19952976a318be33d70601b02f1e86d5c fcc3d57	31 Oct 2014	3
a5578896fd688231e6cc2eb54decfd1d56e1e372db3207efd9f45f4dac7cdad0	11 Nov 2014	3
7c0686aa4ea5d9f6c1e8ff980e1d0ce88f3052b4a8b1785a304b17e2fec534e0	21 Dec 2014	3
87fe748ff9bfc9a0c3be fea3cce f164390f1edb46dc4128aaece6e0b2f2a5ed3	26 Dec 2014	3

11.2.1 Group 1 - PlugX

This single file uses `msi.dyload` as the payload. It is detected as PlugX by antivirus and `msi.dll` is a PlugX loader. Displays the common "THIS IS A DEMO VERSION!!!" message.

11.2.2 Group 2 - PlugX

These files use `msi.dll.mov` as the payload. A large number of similar files were uploaded through 2014, all using the vulnerable Kaspersky executable. Many are detected as PlugX by antivirus.

11.2.3 Group 3 - Maudi

These files use Maudi / PoisonIvy as the payload (in `flash.ini`) and appear to be targeted at Mongolia. For more information see the document *The Chinese Malware Complexes: The Maudi Surveillance Operation*¹⁵ from Bluecoat.

The dropper looks like a Word file and loads a decoy document after execution. Examples of the decoy contents are:

- Screenshots from the Twitter account @tsnyamaa.
- A memorandum of understanding between France and Mongolia defence ministries.

File names include:

- `MNG-FRA MOU MNG after MFA revision+Paris ESYam revision.exe`
- `AH-MAXH nyuc geree.doc .exe`
- `доверенность.exe` ("Power of attorney")
- `[2014 IAL-KLRI International Conference] Registration Form.exe`

Online locations the droppers were found at include:

- `web.happymyanmar.net/hollywood/photo.exe`

¹⁵<https://www.bluecoat.com/documents/download/2c832f0f-45d2-4145-bdb7-70fc78c22b0f>

12 Useful breakpoints

The following list of breakpoints are given to enable analysis of the executable in WinDbg.

12.1 Kaspersky executable

- Insecure call to LoadLibrary that triggers load of alternate msi.dll: bp setup+1474

12.2 msi.dll

- Break on load: sxe ld msi
- XOR decode routine: bp msi+1000
- Entry point: bp msi+1031
- Call to XOR decode: bp msi+1167
- Call to shellcode: bp msi+116f

12.3 Shellcode

Because the shellcode is dynamically loaded in memory the base address of each memory region may change between runs. It is possible to assign the base address to a variable:

- Break after VirtualAlloc: bp msi+1133
- Save returned base address: r @\$t0 = eax
- Run until after code is loaded: bp msi+116f; g

Now breakpoints can be added which are relative to this base address:

- Break on shellcode entry: bp @\$t0
- Position independence trick: bp @\$t0+8ED
- Shellcode import resolver: bp @\$t0+236
- Embedded PE loader: bp @\$t0+2B2
- Before calling executable: bp @\$t0+3D1

Note that if you attempt to set breakpoints before the code is loaded WinDbg will not add them correctly. Hardware (on access) breakpoints could be used if desired (see WinDbg help for command ba) but there are a limited number available.

13 Changes

- 2016-07-10: v1.0 released publicly.
- 2016-07-14: v1.1 released with clarified information in section 6.3.1 (credit Marc Ochsenmeier).

14 Contact details

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